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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF MIGNON DENHALTER LEWIS

Case No.
7724

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a proceeding for the determination of
whether or not William H. English is entitled to a portion of the estate of Mignon Denhalter 'Lewis.

Mr.

English claims that his father, William Henry Johnston,
was a natural son of Henry Charles Denhalter, who was
a brother of the deceased, Mignon Denhalter Lewis.
That while his father was admittedly born out of lawful wedlock, it is the claim of Mr. English that he is
none the less entitled to participate in the distribution
of the estate of Mrs. Lewis because of being the natural
grandchild of Henry Charles Denhalter and on account
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Henry Charles Denhalter having acknowledged the
father of the claimant as his (Henry Charles Denhalter's) child and on account of said Henry Charles Denhalter having married the grandmother of the claimant.
Three of the admitted lawful sons of Henry Charles
Denhalter are resisting the claim of Mr. English.
It is established without controversy that Mignon
Denhalter Lewis died without leaving surviving her any
children, parents or husband and that the next of kin
was a sister who was entitled to one-half of the estate
and the he~irs at law of her deceased brother, who are
entitled to the other one-half of her estat.e. The Court
concluded that the three lawful sons of the deceased
brother of Mrs. Lewis and Mr. English the claimant are
entitled to share and share alike in the one-half of the
residue of the estate of Mrs. Lewis. The three lawful
sons of Henry Charles Denhalter contend that the claimant, William H. English, is not entitled to participate in
the distribution of the estate of Mrs. Lewis and they are
prosecuting this appeal from the decree and judgment
awarding to William H. English a part of the estate
of Mrs. Lewis.

In order to give the court a better understanding of
the matters which divide the parties to this proceeding, we have deemed it advisable to give the court an
abstract of the material pa_rt of the evidence which was
offered at the trial.
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It 'Yas n1ade to appear at the trial 'vithout dispute
that Henry C~harles Denhalter, the clailned grandfather
of the elailnant, \Y.illirun H. English, died on August 10,
1931.
That William Henry Johnston, the father of the
claimant, died on April 29, 1937.
That Mrs. Mignon Denhalter Lewis died on September 5, 1949 (Tr. 3) and that claimant was born out
of wedlock. ( Tr. 5)
William John Clark, a witness called by claimant,
testified in substance as follows: That he resides at 375
Eighth East Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, where he
has lived since 1903. That he was acquainted with and
a friend of a family by the name of Johnston, but not
related to them. That one of the J ohnstons was a police
officer. (Tr. 5) That he had a number of cleaning women
work for him, one of whose name was a Mrs. Rosa;
that there was a child born at his home. Over objection
of counsel for the Denhalter boys that the testimony
was hearsay, he was permitted to testify. That his wife
made arrangements with a Dr. Root about bringing a
girl to his home to be confined. (Tr. 6)
even want to see the baby.

The girl didn't

She was not at his home

more than 3 days; that he never saw the girl; that his
wife told him about the child born at his home and that
it was a boy. (Tr. 8)

That Mrs. Rosa's daughter had

the child; that a child was in the home of Mr. Clark a
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number of times after it was born. That the J ohnstons
had the child; that he had difficulty in remembering;
that he has nearly lost his mind. (Tr. 10) That after
the child was born, Charles Denhalter and the child's
mother came to his home and demanded the child about
a year or less after the child was born; that when the
witness went to the door, Charlie Denhalter threatened
to beat the witness up because he would not tell him
where the child was. He told Charlie Denhalter that
he didn't know where the child was, but it was out of
the state. (Tr. 11) That he had not seen the woman
who came with Charlie Denhalter to get the child before
the time they came to his house; that he saw quite often
the child that the J ohnstons had for four or five years
or maybe five or six years after they received it. (Tr. 12)
That when he next saw Henry William Johnston, he was
a grown man; that was in 1927 when Henry William
Johnston asked if he, Mr. Clark, would tell him, Johnston, who his father was and if he would go to court and
swear who his father was which he, Clark, said he did;
that he, Clark, told Johnston that his father was Charlie
Denhalter; (Tr. 13) that Mr. Denhalter called up Clark
and said- that his statement about being the father of
Johnston raised a big dis~turbance in his family; that
he nearly lost his wife on account of doing that; that he
was going to knock his block off. (Tr. 14)
On cross-examination he testified that he was a bartender and was not running a hotel or a hospital at the
time the child was born in his home; that he had never
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seen the supposed 1nother of the baby born in his home
until she caine and den1anded the baby; (Tr. 14) that
he didn't kno"'" that the baby born in his ho1ne was taken
to the Johnston's ho1ne except froin what he "\Vas told
by the women folks~ that he ,,~as a "vitness to the adoption of the child by the J ohnstons; (Tr. 15) that after
the child was taken into the Johnston home, he saw it
about t'vice a Inonth until it \vas three or four years old
and then he did not see him for about 18 years. (Tr. 16)
Mary Ann English testified that she married her
present husband in 1937 and that she married Mr. Johnston, her former husband in 1927 or 1924. (Tr. 18) That
she came to Salt Lake City in 1927 and met her husband's family consisting of Mrs. Johnston and Frances
Loveless; that she also met the Denhalters; that Mrs.
Denhalter came to the hospital while she was there; that Mr. Denhalter wanted them to come to their home;
(Tr. 19) that arrangements were made to have Mrs.
Julia Hummel come t.o Salt Lake; (Tr. 20) that before
she was a Hummel her name was Julia Rosa Denhalter.
(Tr. 21) That Mr. Denhalter seemed to be quite happy
that he had found Henry Johnston; that Mr. and Mrs.
Henry Charles Denhalter provided money for the living
expenses of the \vitness and her then husband; (Tr. 22)
that the Denhalters got a house for the witness and her
husband and the J ohnstons let them have some furniture; that the \vitness and her husband resided in the
home secured for the1n five or six months and then moved
back to the Denhalters, where the child, claimant herein,
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was born. That when Mr. Denhalter was home he treated
the witnesses son the same as his children; that she
stayed at the Denhalte-r home until her child was four or
five months old; (Tr. 23) that the witness and her
husband moved into an auto court (Tr. 25) and soon
thereafter she and her husband separated and Mr. Denhalter told her husband that if he did not treat his wife,
the witness, better he would disown him and that she
could come and stay at the home of the Denhalters; that
off and on she stayed at the Denhalter's home with her
son, the claimant herein, until the boy was five years
old; (Tr. 26) that since the death of Henry Charles
Denhalter, the Denhalter family have been very congenial with the witness; that on one occasion Dick or
Richard Denhalter said that the claimant's father was
his half-brother; (Tr. 27) that the Denhalter boys were
not denying that; that the claimant was a grandson of
their father, (Tr. 29) but they thought that he was not
entitled to as much of the estate of Mrs. Lewis as they
were; (Tr. 30) that the witness has attempted to get
Julia Rosa Denhalter Hummel to come and testify for
her; that she has not been able to get in touch with her
since she last talked with her which was in 1950; a
returned letter addressed to Mrs. Julia Hummel, 1020
West 89th, Los Angeles, California, was received in evidence over the objections of counsel for the Denhalter
boys. (Tr. 31-32)
On cross-examination, Mrs. English .testified that she
was 23 years of age when she first came to Salt Lake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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City~

that her husband "'"as then ~2 years of age; (Tr. 33)
that her husband was about 19 years of age when she
first 1net hin1 in Boston, 'vhere he was employed as a
n1ale nurse; that she and her husband were in Salt Lake
about nine months or a year before they 1net the Denhalters: that after the birth of her baby she and her
husband had trouble; that she called up the Denhalters
and told then1 her husband had beaten her and they came
down and took her to their home; (Tr. 34) that her
husband had been at the Denhalter home some time before he and ~Ir. Denhalter had trouble because her husband was stealing and selling Denhal'ter's guns, etc. ;
that Mr. Denhalter told the husband of the witness that
if he did not treat her better, he didn't want to see him
again; that ~Ir. Denhalter tried to get a job for the husband of the witness but he could not hold a a job; (Tr. 35)
that Mr. Denhalter said he would make room for the
witnesses husband and he, Denhalter, was glad to find
him after all these years and he sent for the mother of
the boy. (Tr. 36)
Mary Frances Johnston Loveless testified for the
claimant. She testified that she is the daughter of John
Henry Johnston, who was a police sergeant at the time
he was killed, which occurred on July 5, 1911; (Tr. 37)
that she remembers that in 1905 of going to Bill Clark's
with her folks; that she was six or seven years old and
she went out into the kitchen and saw a girl sitting with
this baby on her lap getting its clothes on and Mrs. Clark
was helping; the baby was a boy and the baby grew up in
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the Johnston home and was named William Henry Johnston; that some time after she was visiting at the Clark
home with her father and mother and was playing in the
front yard when this girl came with a boy and went into
the house, and the girl said "I know the people are here
with the baby because the little girl that was here that
came out in the kitchen when they took the baby, is playing in the front yard," and she says, ''and also the baby's
bonnett is laying right over there on the couch, so I know
they are in the house. Of course there was a big argument and they left and my folks were out in the hack of
the house with the baby; (Tr. 38) she was permitted to
testify over objection that her mother kept a chest and
the witness looked in the chest and found a little piece
of paper that had 'the name Julia Rosa on it and Charles
Henry Denhalter and the baby's age." A motion to strike
the foregoing evidence was by the court denied. (Tr. 40)
Mrs. Loveless further testified 'that when William
Henry Johnston came back from Boston with his wife
that she told him that his father was Henry Denhalter
and where he lived and she thought he ought to go meet
him; that because of doing so, Mrs. Loveless's mother
wanted to disown her; that the conversation with he.r
adopted brother occurred about a month after he came
to Salt Lake. ( Tr. 41)
On cross-examination, the witness testified that
when the couple came to the Clark home they wanted the
baby, but she didn't know what was said; that the time
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
the couple came to get the baby \Vas after they were rnarried \vhich as is sho'vn by the nu1rriage certificate, which
was received in evidence, occurred on July 31, 1905. (Tr.
4:2) That they said they \van ted the baby. (Tr. 45) That
she "Tas six or seven years old at the tin1e. (Tr.46)
Mrs. Elizabeth Denhalter, the surviving widow of
Henry Charles Denhalter was called as a wi-tness by the
claimant and testified that she met Henry Johnston and
his wife when they came to Salt Lake in June 1926 ; that
she saw 1Irs. Johnston, now Mrs. English, in the hospital
and they were later taken into the home of the witness
and her husband; that Mrs. Johnston was ill at the time;
that when they came to the Denhalter home, she didn't
recall her husband saying anything, (Tr. 48) that she
knew that her husband had been married and divorced
when she married him; that Mr. Denhalter's first wife
was named Julia Rosa and later she married a Mr. Hummel; (Tr. 49) that Mr. Denhalter asked the witness about
having the mother of Henry Johnston come to the Denhalter house and Mrs. Denhalter told him to do as he
saw fit; that Mr. Denhalter advanced the money for Mrs.
Hummel to come to Salt Lake, but the same was later
repaid to Mr. Denhalter by Mrs. Hummel. That Mrs.
Hummel came late in August and stayed quite some time;
that Mrs. Denhalter got very tired of her and almost
had to kick her out; that she left late in the fall; that
Mrs. Johnston was sick and needed help and Mrs. Denhalter was glad to help her; that she didn't know what
went on between Mr. and Mrs. Johnston and her husband;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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( Tr. 50) that when the J ohnstons took up housekeeping
on their own account, the Denhalters helped them and
paid the rent; that Mrs. Johnston came off and on to
the Denhalter home because her husband didn't furnish
her a home; that Mrs. Denhalter took care of Mrs. Johnston when her baby was born, who is the claimant in this
proceeding; that the mother went to work when the baby
was about 10 months old. (Tr. 51-a)
On cross-examination, 1\{rs. Denhal ter testified that
Mrs. Hummel probably did not stay quite two months;
that the Johnston boy was sick while he was at the Denhalter home; that the Johnston boy and Mr. Denhalter
had difficulty right from the beginning; that the Johnston boy took things and finally Mr. Denhalter kicked
him out; that upon one occasion his wife, now Mrs.
English, called the Denhalters in the middle of the night
because her husband had thrown her out and the Denhalters went and got her and took her to the Denhalter
home. (Tr. 51-b) That at that time her son, the claimant,
was not more than two or three months old. (Tr. 52-53)
The claimant called as a witness a Mrs. Rella Gleason, who testified that she knew Julia Rosa as a girl;
that they lived in the same neighborhood as girls; that
she remembered Julia Rosa and Henry Charles Denhal'ter keeping company and of their being married. (Tr.
52)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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:Jirs. Ann Clark English, the wife of the claimant,
'vas called as a "\Yitness and after n1uch hedging and
leading, she testified that Dick Denhalter stated that
claimant's father "\Yas his half-brother. (Tr. 56-58)
vVilliam Henry English, the claimant, testified on
his own behalf and stated that on one occasion when he
was being introduced one of the Denhalter boys said that
he, William English, was his nephew; that on another
occasion the three Denhalter boys met with the claimant
and his father and mother to talk over the matter of
settling their rights in the property of the estate of
Mrs. Lewis, at which time Jack Denhalter finally said:
"We are not denying that you are, but you are not entitled to as much of it as we are." A motion to strike this
evidence because it was an attempt to compromise the
litigation was denied.
Alvin Ray English was called as a witness for the
claimant and testified that he is the adopted father of
William English, the claimant herein; that he had been
quite active in investigating the claim of his adopted son;
that up to the time the Denhalter boys employed an attorney rthe Denhalters had not denied that William
English was in the blood line of the Denhalters; (Tr.
87) that he recalled the time when the three Denhalter
boys had a talk with him, his wife and adopted son; that
they gave the impression that they wanted to settle the
property of Mrs. Lewis ; that at that time nothing was
said about whether or not William English was a DenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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halter; that at one time he went with the Denhalter boys
to consult a lawyer about the Lewis estate. (Tr. 88-89)
On cross-examination he testified that he had adopted
and taken care of the claimant since he was a small boy.
(Tr. 89)
The Denhalters offered in evidence some court
records which show that Julia R. Denhalter secured a
divorce from Henry C. Denhalter on July 29, 1910. (Tr.
64-67) No mention is made in the decree of the parties
having had any children. It was further made to appear
from the court records that John Henry J ohns'ton and
his wife, Tishia B. Johnston sought to and were permitted
to adopt an illegitimate child, the son of Julia Roberts.
(Tr. 69-70) The decree is dated January 8, 1906. (Tr.
71-72)
As a part of the court records appears the follow1ng:

Adoption of William Henry Johnston
To Whom it may concern:
This is to certify that I the undersigned, the
Mother of an infant boy do hereby relinquish
any claim I have to said child and consent
that said boy be adopted by whomsoever the
court may see fit to give him to, and I hereby waive all notice of adoption and consent
that it may be done without any notice to me.
Witness:
Mrs. W. J. Clark
W. J. Clark

Julia Roberts
Mother

(Tr. 71)
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The Consent to adoption is not dated.
The Denhalter boys 'vere sworn and denied having
introduced the clain1ant as their nephew. Charles Richard
Denhalter testified that he did not recall saying anything
to the claiinant's "rife about being related to the claimant's father. ( Tr. 7-±) He further testified that he recalled
that he and his brothers n1et with the claimant and his
adopted father and mother when they talked about the
estate of Mrs. Lewis; that Mr. English, the adopted
father of the claimant, had assured the three Denhalter
boys that he had conclusive evidence that the claimant
was a Denhalter and they went to find out about the
facts and to see what could be done'. (Tr. 74-75)
On cross-examination he testified that he heard that
the claimant had received $1500.00 out of his grandfather's estate, but that he didn't know how it came about
that the $1500.00 was paid, (Tr. 77) whether it came out
of the estate or was paid by Mrs. Campbell to prevent
notoriety about the matter. As to the occasion of the
Denhalter boys meeting with the claimant and her mother
and father, the testimony of the two other Denhalter
boys is substantially the same as that above summarized.
(Tr. 78)
In order to properly construe the law of this state
touching children born out of wedlock, we have thus
deemed it necessary to summarize the evidence. We shall
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have further comments to make about the evidence in
connection with the various provisions of our statutory
law.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The appellants assign the following errors upon
which 'they rely for reversal of the Judgment appealed
from:

POINT ONE
The trial court erred in admitting over the objection
of the appellants the following testimony of the witness
William John Clark.
(a) Well, the arrangements were made between the
doctor and my wife and this girl's Mother to bring the
baby there or the girl to have her baby, and it was to be
given to the J ohnstons. This girl didn't even want to see
the baby and gave it away as quickly as possible. (Tr. 8)
(b) She, his wife, told him about the birth of the
child in his home.
(c) She, his wife, told him that Mrs. Rosa's daughter was the Mother of the child and that it was a boy.
(Tr. 9)

(d) That Julia Rosa was the one who p·urported
to have had the child in his home. (Tr. 12)
(e) ThaJt he saw the baby born in his home in the
Johnston home. (Tr. 12)
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POINT TWO
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence, over
the objection of the appellants and in refusing :to strike,
the following testimony of the witnesses Mary Frances
Johnston Loveless.
a() ~Iy Mother kept a chest. I guess I can tell
that-and I looked in this chest and found a little piece
of paper that had the nan1e Julia Rosa on it and Charles
Henry Denhalter and the baby's age, and I guess that
is about all that was on it, just a little piece of paper
about like this. ( Tr. 40)
POINT THREE
The trial court erred in finding that William H.
English, the claimant, is the grandson of Henry Charles
Denhalter because such finding is not supported by any
substantial competent evidence. (R. 6)
POINT FOUR
The trial court erred in making its Conclusion of
Law that the claimant, William H. English, is entitled
to participate in the distribution of the estate of Mignon
Denhalter Lewis, deceased. (R. 8)
POINT FIVE
The trial court erred in awarding to the claimant,
William H. English, a part of the estate of Mignon Denhalter Lewis, deceased. (R. 10)
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the
testimony of the witness William John Clark as to what
he was told by his wife.
The trial court admitted In evidence the hearsay
testimony of the witness Clark, apparently upon the
theory that such testimony falls within an exception to
the hearsay rule in that it was testimony touching pedigree. There are two reasons why the testimony of Mr.
Clark as to what he was told by his wife does not fall
within the rule. First, what Mrs. Clark told her husband
was not in any sense a matter of family history or pedigree and second, neither Mr. Clark nor his wife were
competent witnesses to give hearsay testimony as to the
pedigree of the Denhalters.
The authorities teach that hearsay evidence as to the
history of a family or what is frequently referred to as
pedigree may be established by hearsay testimony. However, what Mrs. Clark told her husband about Mrs. Rosa's
daughter being confined in his home, about the arrangements made to have the child adopted by the J ohnstons,
about the child being a boy, about a Dr. Root waiting on
the woman who was confined in his home, etc., is obviously not a matter of family history or pedigree. Moreover, it is quite generally held that "declarations (as to
pedigree) must not only have been made by a person
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since deceased, but Innst also have been made by a person
related by blood or affinity \Yith so1ne branch of the
family, the pedigree 'vhich is in question." Vol. 3, page
2080, Jones Com1nentaries on Evidence.
The rule is thus stated in 31 C.J.S., page 976, Sec.

229. ''While there appears to be son1e authority to the
contrary as a general rule, for a declaration of pedigree
to be admissable, it must have been made by someone
related to the family concerned. Consequently, under
the general rule, the courts will not receive declarations
as to pedigree made by intimate friends, or neighbors or
even by persons living in the family, or by servants, however trustworth, or however long employed in the family."
Cases are cited in footnotes to the texts which support
the same.

POINT TWO
The testimony of Mrs. Loveless that she saw a paper
in her Mother's chest containing "the name of Julia Rosa
.
and Charles Henry Denhalter and the baby's age" was
clearly incompetent. (Tr. 40)
Before written evidence of pedigree may be received
in evidence it must be made to appear that the writing
was made or recognized by some member of the family
whose pedigree is brought in question. Vol. 3, page 2110
Sec. 1148 Jones Commentaries on Evidence.
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POINT THREE
The only ~testimony of probative value as to the
parentage of the claimant, other than incomp,etent hearsay testimony elicited from the witness Clark, is that this
girl, the mother of this baby, and her husband Charles
came to the house and demanded the baby about a year
or less after its birth and threatened to beat the witness
up because he wouldn't tell where the child was. (Tr. 1012) It may here be noted that Mr. Clark did not, except
by hearsay, know \vho was the mother of the child that
was adopted by the J ohnstons nor did he know, except
by hearsay, where the J ohnstons received the child.
The ~testimony of the witness Mrs. Loveless, touching
what she personally knows about the parentage of the
father of the claimant is that she saw the mother of the
child dressing it and that at a later time the mother of
the child and a boy came to get the child and an argument ensued. (Tr. 38)
Mrs. Mary Ann English, the mother of the claimant, testified that Mr. Henry Charles Denhalter stated
that he found his boy after all these years, that he sent
for the mother of the boy and that Mr. and Mrs. Denhalter helped her and her husband by letting them live
in the home of the Denhalters (Tr. 20-23) and later Mr.
Denhalter ordered the father of the claimant out of his
house. ( Tr. 35)
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Elizabeth Denhalter, the 8Urviving wido'v of
Henry Charles Denhalter, testified that she knew that
her husband sent money to have the purported grandnlother of the claimant come to Salt Lake, that she knew
her husband had been 1narried before she was married
to him. That she and her husband took him and his wife
into their home (Tr. 48) and J\tirs. Hummel, the purported
grand.Inother of the clain1ant, stayed at the Denhalter
home not quite t'Yo months. (Tr. 51) That the husband
of the witness, Henry Charles Denhalter, and the Johnston boy had difficulty from the time he came to the
Denha!rter home because he, the Johnston boy, would
take things from the house every chance he got and
finally her husband kicked him out; that the wife of the
Johnston boy called her husband up in the middle of the
night because the Johnston boy had thrown her out while
they were living in an auto court. (Tr. 51 b)
The foregoing is a brief summary of all of the evidence touching the admission of Henry Charles Denhalte~r
as to his relation to the father of the claimant.
It should be noted at the outset that even if Henry
Charles Denhalter was the father of an illegitimate
child, he could not possibly know whether or not Henry
William Johnston was that child. He had not seen the
boy, Henry William Johnston, until the latter was a
matured man of the age of 21 or 22 years of age. So also
the mo'ther of the child had not seen him from the time
he was about three days old until he came to Salt Lake
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when he was 21 or 22 years of age. We have heretofore
pointed out that the witnesses, Mr. Clark and Mrs. Loveless, who were permitted to testify about facts calculated
to establish the claim that Henry Charles Denhalter was
the father of the Johnston boy did so from hearsay or
from their own conclusions based upon hearsay. The
testimony of the mother of the claimant consists mostly
of conclusions and on cross-examination she, in effect,
admitted that Henry Charles Denhalter disowned the
father of the claimant. The meager testimony touching
the claim that Henry Charles Denhalter was the grandfather of the claimant should be viewed in the light of
the fact that Henry Charles Denhalter married the
mother of the Johnston boy a short time after his birth.
That being so the fact that Henry Charles Denhalter
accompanied the purported grandmother of the claimant
to the Clark home to get the Johnston child would be as
consistent with Henry Charles Denhalter being the stepfather of the Johnston child as it would be with the claim
that the Johnston child was the natural child of Denhalter. Indeed, if Henry Charles Denhalter wa.s the
father of the Johnston boy it is difficult to understand
why he did not marry her before the birth of the child.
I't is also very strange that the purported grandmother
of the claimant did not appear at the

tri~

if Henry

Charles Denhalter was in truth and in fact the natural
father of the Johnston boy. We, of course, can appreciate
thrut Mrs. Hummel the purported Mother of the Johnston
child would be unable to testify of her own knowledge that
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the ntother of the person claiming to be the child
born to her because she had not seen that child since he
was three days old. It is the established law in this jurisdiction that one 1nay not be held to be the illegitimate
child of a n1an and as such entitled to inherit a part of
his estate unless among other facts it is shown that such
a claimant is in fact the natural child of the person who
he claims to be his ancestor. If an acknowledgement of
parentage is relied upon, such acknowledgement must be
unambiguous. In re: Roberts Estate 69 Utah 548; 256

Pac. 1068; In re Newell's Estate 78 U t. 463 ; 5 Pac.
(2d) 230.
In any event as we shall presently point out, the
evidence in this case is not sufficient to support a decree
or judgment awarding to the claimant any part of the
esta:te of Mignon Denhalter Lewis, deceased.
POINTS FOUR and FIVE
The evidence in this case is wholly insufficient to
support Conclusions of Law and a Decree awarding to
William H. English any part of the Estate of Mignon
Denhalter Lewis, deceased.

Points four and five go to the same question, namely,
that the claimant has not brought himself within any provision of the Laws of Utah that entitle him to any part
of the estate of Mrs. Lewis.
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We again direct the attention of the court to a number of facts which are not in dispute. Such facts are:
Henry Charles Denhalter, the claimed grandfather
of the claimant, died on August 10, 1931. (Tr. 4)
William Henry Johnston, the father of the claimant,
died on April29, 1937.
Mignon Denhalter Lewis died on Sept. 5, 1949. (Tr.
3) That Henry Charles Denhalter was a brother of
Mignon Denhalter Lewis and that she left surviving her
three nephews, Charles Richard Denhalter, Robert Keith
Denhalter and Jackson Henry Denhalter, children of her
brother, Henry Charles Denhalter, and one sister. That
William Henry Johnston was born on or about Dec. 24th
or 29th, 1904. (Tr. 43-46) Julia Roberts, the mother,
consented to the adoption but the date of the consent
does not appear. (Tr. 71) That Henry Charles Denhalter
and Julia Rosa were married on or about July 31, 1905
(Tr. 47) and were divorced on July 29, 1910. (Tr. 65-67)
That Henry Charles Denhalter did not see William Henry
Johnston the natural father of the claimant until 1926.
(Tr. 18) That the supposed grandmother so far as appears did not see William Henry Johnston, from the time
he was about 3 days old until in 1926. (Tr. 18) That the
claimant' has been adopted· by Alvin Ray English, but
the date of such adoption does not appear. (Tr. 87)
So far as we are able to ascertain, in jurisdiction
where the common law prevails, the following principles
of law are established:
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person born out of lawful wedlock is a
bastard or illegitimate." 7 Am. Jur. page 628,
Sec. 4.
Hln the absence of a statute to the contrary
the mere fact that the parents of an illegitimate
child n1arry after its birth does not render it legitimate." 7 Am. Jur. page 665, Sec. 58 and cases
there cited. To the same effect see 10 C.J.S., page
61, Sec. 12 and cases there cited.
"lTnder both the common and civil law an
illegitimate child cannot inherit from its father
or other blood relatives except probably its
~Iother." See Annotation in 24 A.L.R. 584 and 83
A.L.R. 1334.

It is however, within the power of the legislature to
change the rule and it has been changed in many jurisdictions, including Utah. See Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S.
682, 34 L. Ed 832, 11 Sup. Ct. 222 ; Annotation 23 A.L~R.
586 ; 83 ·A.L.R. 1335 ; Ann cases 1917 C 826; Mansfield
v. Neff, 43 Utah 258; 134 Pac. 1160.
There is such a diversity of legislative enactments
in the various states of the union that precedents touching a construction of the language of any given statute
are frequently not available. Some of the statutes confer
upon an illegitimate child a limited right of inheritance
from blood relatives, particularly the father and mother,
while other statutes merely provide that under a designated state of facts, the illegitimate child is rendered
legitimate. As we read the Utah laws touching illegitiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mate children, some of such statutes confer upon illegitirnate children the right of inheritance from the father
and mother, while others render such a child legitimate
without limitation.
In its Memorandum of Opinion the trial court held
that the claimant was rendered legitimate by the provisions of U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14, which provides that "If the
mother of any such child and the father shall at any time
after its birth intermarry, the child shall in all respects
be deemed to be legitimate and the bond for its support
shall thereupon become void."
The section of the statute just quoted is a part of
the Chapter on bastardy.
The bastardy s'tatute was enacted in 1911. In the
original enactment the section just quoted read thus:
"If the mother of any bastard child and the reputed
father shall at any time after the birth intermarry said
child shall in all respects be deemed to be legitimate and
the bond for the support of said child shall thereupon
become void." Laws of Utah 1911, Chapter 62, Sec. 14,
page 87. In Complied Laws of Utah 1917, the foregoing
provision was Sec. 393.
In Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, Sec. 14 of Chapter
2 of Title 14 is the same as it is at present and as it appears in U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14 above quoted. Thus the
status of the claimant must be determined by the provisions of U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14 because Mrs. Lewis, from
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'vhom clailnant asserts the right to inherit, died on Sept.
5, 19-±9 and her estate must be distributed by the law as it
then provided.
It is, of course, elementary that unless a law is ambiguous there is no occasion to construe it, and the courts
may not, under the guise of construction, create an ambiguity and then proceed to construe the ambiguity thus
created. 50 Am. Jur. page 204, Sec. 225; Salt Lake Union
Stock 1Tards v. State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 166; 71
Pac. (2d) 538; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 103; 277 Pac. 206.
If the statute now being discussed read as it did
prior to 1933, there might be some color to the claim that
the statute was open to construction because it then read:
"If the mother of any bastard child and the reputed
father" etc. and then provided t.hat the bond for its support should be void.
The only reason we can conceive of for amending the
provision of U.C.A., 1943 14-2-14 from the way it originally read to the way it now reads was to remove all
ambiguity in the original language. The expression "such
a child" in the present law must mean a child that has
been judicially determined to be the child of the person
who marries the mother. The word "such" is defined as
"of that kind, of the like kind, etc." Unless the word
"such" is to be entirely ignored it must refer to a child
that has been judicially determined to be the child of
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the person who marries i'ts mother. If the language "such
a child" meant any bastard child there would have been
no purpose of the legislature making the amendment by
using the expression "such a child" instead of any bastard
child as was done by the amendment of 1933. So, also by
substituting the words "the father" in the amendment
for the words "the reputed father" the legislature must
have had in mind in the amendment the person who has
been adjudicated to be the father instead of "the reputed
father" as used in the act before it was amended. Moreover, if there should be any doubt about the meaning of
the statute as it now is and since 1933 has been such doubt
is entirely removed by the language "the bond for its
support shall thereupon become void." Obviously there
would be no bond to be declared void except the bond
of one who has been adjudged the father of a child born
out of lawful wedlock.
In connection with what we have said, the attention
of the court is directed to the oft repeated holding of the
cou:Its that "It is a general rule that the courts, in the.
interpretation of a statute, may not take, strike or read
anything out of a statute or delete, subtract or omit anything therefrom." To the contrary it is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that significance and effect should,
if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence
and part of an act. 50 Am. Jur. page 219, Sec. 231, and
1

50 Am. Jur., page 361, Sec. 358 and case cited in foot
notes among which is the case of Dunn v. Bryan, 77 Utah
604; 229 Pac. 253.
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It \vas urged by counsel for claimant in the court
below and the trial court in its Memorandum of Decision
held that statutes calculated to legitimate bastard children should be given a liberal and not a strict construction. Such statement will be found in some of the adjudicated cases. ,V. e have n~ quarrel with such view if and
when properly applied. In Utah there is no justification
for applying a different rule of construction for statutes
dealing with the legitimation of bastard children than is
applied in the construction of other statutes. U.C.A., 1943
88-2-2 provides that:
"The rule of common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has
no application to the statutes of this state. The
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting
the subject to which they relate and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice."
The foregoing statute is applicable generally to all statutory laws in this state.
"A liberal construction is subject to the principle that all rules of statutory construction are
merely for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legislature as expressed in the
statute. It does not permit the courts to effectuate
its own conception of right by putting into a law
that which the legislature never intended to be
there. The doctrine of liberal construction does
not imply that the legislative mandate may be
disregarded, or that the words of the statute may
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be ignored or frittered away, or given an unnatural or forced meaning. A liberal construction
does not authorize the courts to read into a statute
something which does not come within the meaning
of the language used, or which unreasonably restricts, or enlarges or extends, by implication, the
scope of the statute, or the plain provisions of
the law as written, to matters not within the intent
of the law, or beyond the field of its purpose, or
contrary to its design, or the meaning of the statute as indicated by the context. * * *" 50 Am. J ur.,
Sec. 387, page 403 and cases cited in foot notes.
To hold that U.C.A., 1943 14-2-14 grants to illegitimate
children the same rights of inheritance from all ancestors
and collateral blood relatives as are given to legitimate
children is to ignore the plain language of ou!-" various
statutes dealing with illegitimate children.
It is our contention that before an illegitimate child
is awarded a right to inherit from collateral blood relatives he must bring himself within the provisions of either
U.C.A., 1943 14-2-14 above quoted, or U.C.A., 1943 14-4-12.
There is a very good reason why the law making
powers of Utah should grant to illegitimate children the
right to inherit from collateral blood relatives when and
only when either such illegitimate child is judicially determined to be the natural child of the putative father and
such father and its mother thereafter marry or when as
provided in U.C.A., 1943 14-4-12, the father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it as such with the .consent of his wife, if he is
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married, into his family, and other,vise treating it as if
it were a legitimate child thereby adopts it as such and
such child is thereupon deen1ed for all purposes legitimate from the tin1e of its birth. The foregoing provisions·
of this chapter do not apply to such an adoption.
In either of the foregoing cases there is notice to
the world and particularly to the blood relatives of the
putative father that he claims the child as his child.
It is a common trait of human nature for people,
who have accumulated property, to desire that such property upon death, pass to persons of their choosing. If a
person is content, as many are, to have his or her property descend according to the law of succession, no purpose is accomplished by making a Will. Generally speaking, people know who are their relatives born in lawful
wedlock and those who have been adjudicated and treated
as such. But it is rare that one is advised of a relative's
illegitimate offspring in the absence of such offspring
being treated as such. If, therefore, one does not know
of the existence of an illegitimate child of a blood relative,
it would be a grave injustice to one dying intestate to
ordain that his or her property should be inherited by
a person unknown to him or her, or if known, not advised
as to any relationship. Such we conceive is the only
reasonable basis for the legislature making the distinction that is made in the various provisions of our law
touching the rights of inheritance of illegitimate children.
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dren full rights of inheritance from all next of kin the
same as legitimate children, it would have been a simple
matter to have so provided. There would be no conceivable purpose to have enacted the various provisions to
which we have and shall call attention if the legislature
had intended to render an illegitimate child legitimate
merely because its mother and putative father married
after its birth. If the court below is right in its construction of U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14 the adjudication that the
putative father is in fact the father would be wholly without any legal effect as to the legitimation of an illegitimate child, or to its right to inherit from collateral blood
relatives. Such a construction is at war with the language
of U.C.A. 1943 14-2-14. A number of states have provided
that the marriage of the parents of an illegitimate child
renders it legitimate, but in such states there are no additional provisions such as are found in U.C.A. 1943, 14-214.
We have heretofore quoted the provisions of U.C. A.
1943, 14-4-12 where upon a compliance with the provisions thereof an illegitimate child is deemed legitimate
for all purposes.
There are various reasons why neither the claimant
nor his father comes within the provisions of that statute.
Among them are: Under our statute only minor children
may be adopted. U.C.A. 1943, 14-4-1 provides:
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minor child may be adopted by an adult
person, or a child, not a minor, whose parents are
both dead, may be adopted by another adult person
as in this chapter provided."
The provisions of lT.C.A. 1943, 14-4-12 and 14-4-1
have both been taken from California where they were
construed long before they beca1ne the law of Utah.
U.C.A. 1943, 14-4-12 is now 230 of the California 1941
Civil Code.
The following cases from California have construed
U.C.A., 1943, 14-4-12:

Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225; 223 Pac. 972;
Estate of Gird, 157 Cal. 534; 108 Pac. 499;
137 Am. St. Rep. 131;

Estate of Jones, 166 Cal. 108; 135 Pac. 288;
In re Flood's Estate, 21 Pac. (2d) 579; 217
Cal. 763;
In re Parcell's Estate, 53 Pac. ( 2d) 784;
The cases hold that in order to bring an illegitimate
child within the provisions of U.C.A., 1943, 14-4-12, the
evidence must establish the following:
1. That the child is illegitimate.
2. That the natural father is the person claimed to
be such.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
3. Public acknowledgment of the claimed father that
he is such.
4. That the child was received into the family with
the wife's consent given with the knowledge of the illegitimacy.
5.

The the child was treated as a legitimate child.

The case of In re Estate of Pico, 56 Cal. 413, adds
an additional requisite, namely that the child must be a
minor at the time it is claimed the adoption occurred.
Moreover, it is obvious that the claimant's father
could not be adopted by the Denhalters because he had
been adopted by the J ohnstons, and such adoption was
still in effect. A child may not have two sets of adopted
parents at the same time.
There is an absence of any evidence that Denhalter
publicly acknowledged that he was the father of the Johnston boy. The only evidence of acknowledgment comes
from Mr. Clark, Mrs. English, the claimant's mother and
possibly Mrs. Loveless. Indeed, it is not inconsistent with
their testimony to conclude that Mr. Denhalter merely
clairp.ed to he ·the stepfather of the Johnston child. As illustration ~f the requirements of public acknowledgment
required by the courts to entitle an illegitimate child to
claim a right under a statute such as 1943, 14-4-12, to
participate in an estate of the alleged father, we direct
the attention of the court to two cases which show the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
trend of judicial authority. Record v. Ellis, 97 Kan. 754,
156 Pac. 712; L.R.A. 1916 Ed. 654 and Bisben v. Huntington, l~S Iowa 166: 103 N.vV. 1!4.
Nor does the evidence show that the father of the
claimant 'vas received into the Denhalter family with
the wife's consent given with the knowledge of the illegitimacy. The most that can be said to support such a
claim is that the father of the claimant was sick and Mrs.
Denhalter made no objection to him and his wife temporarily coming to their home. They were not received into
the Denhalter family, but claimant's father and mother
constituted a family. Mrs. Denhalter knew her husband
had been married, but she did not know that claimant's
father was an illegitimate child. Indeed, so far as is made
to appear, none of the witnesses who testified knew such
to be the fact. So also is there an absence of evidence
showing that either Mr. or Mrs. Denhalter treated claimant's father as a legitimate child. Quite to the contrary,
he apparently had not been at the Denhalter home very
long until he was kicked out.
While the court below based its conclusion that the
claimant had a right to a part of the estate of Mrs. Lewis
by reason of the provisions of U.C.A. 1943, 14-2-14 there
are other provisions of our statutory law that require
discussion. By both that Section and U.C.A., 1943 14-4-12
an illegitimate child which meets the requirements of
either of such sections is deemed legitimate. Not so with
the other provisions of our law.
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U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 provides:
"Every illegitimate child is an heir of the
person who acknowledges himself to be the father
of such child and in all cases the heir of his mother
and inherits his or her estate in whole or in part
as the case may be in the same manner as if he
had been born in lawful wedlock. The issue of all
marriages null in law or dissolved by divorce are
legitimate."
It is significant that the foregoing is a part of the
law of succession. It is even more significant that the
plain language used therein limits the right of an illegitimate child to being the heir of the mother and the person
who acknowledges himself to be the father, while a child
which is the issue of a null or a marriage dissolved by
divorce is declared to be legitimate. If it were intended
to make a child legitimate because of an acknowledgment
by the father, the legislature would doubtless have so
provided instead of merely providing that such a child
was the heir of the father who acknowledged his parentage.
The authorities teach that statutory provisions such
as that just quoted are statutes of descent and not legitimate statutes. The law in such particular is thus stated
in 10 C.J.S., 119 where it is said:
"While a statute which gives a duly acknowledged or recognized illegitimate child the right to
inherit from the father has been regarded as
remedial in nature and as one which should be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
liberally construed to effect the purpose of its
enactment, it is an inheritance statute or statute
of descent and not legitimation statute and after
recognition or acknowledgment, the child remains
illegitimate and inherits as an illegitimate child."
Cases are cited in foot notes which support the text.
We have found no case which holds that a statute
such as U.C.A., 1943 101-4-10 has the effect of rendering
an illegitimate child legitimate. Indeed, to reach such a
result would do violence to the language used. It would
enlarge the meaning of the language far beyond the idea
conveyed. That the Legislature intended to restrict the
effect of U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 to the right to inherit from
the father and mother is made apparent, because otherwise it would have used such language as is used in Section 14-2-14 where it is said that a child which falls within its provisions "shall in all respects be deemed to be
legitimate," or such a child as falls within the provisions
of Section 14-4-12 where it is said that a child which falls
within all of its provisions is "thereupon deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of its birth," or as is
said in Section 101-4-10 that "children who are the issues
of void or dissolved marriages are legitimate."
To hold that U.C.A., 1943 101-4-10 gives an illegitimate child a right to inherit from an aunt would be to
re-write or at least substantially add to its provisions.
If the legislature intended that such a child should inherit
from collateral relatives, it would have been a simple
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gitimate child is an heir of the person who acknowledges
himself to be the father of such a child," there was excluded the claim that he was an heir of other persons
except, of course, the mother. The courts uniformly accept and apply in the construction of the statutes the
doctrine of "Expressio U nius Est Exclusive Alterius,"
that is the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another. There are numerous cases cited in a foot note
to the text in 35 C.J.S. 283 where the doctrine is applied.
Numerous other cases will be found collected in 25 C.J.
note 17, pages 220 to 223, both pages inclusive. We do
not claim to have read all of such cases and feel certain
that the court will not undertake such an ardous task.
However, if the court is interested, it will find the following Utah cases cited:

Zamata v. Browning, 51 Ut. 400; 170 Pac.
1057;
Tribune Reporter Printing Co. v. Homer, 51
Ut. 153; 169 Pac. 170;
State v. Shockley, 29 Ut. 25; 80 Pac. 865; 867;
Nichols v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 28
U t. 319, 78 ~ac. 866.
Not only do the provisions of U.C.A., 1943 101-4-10
limit the right of inheritance to the father, but it also
limits such right to his or her estate. The property of
Mrs. Lewis was in no sense a part of the estate of Henry
Charles Denhalter.
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It should be noted that the authorities are uniform
in holding that the use of the word child or children as
used in the la'v of succession means the legitimate children.
There are nmnerous cases involving statutes like or
substantially like our Section 1943, 101-4-10 where it is
held that such language does not make an illegitimate
child legitimate so as to entitle it to inherit from anyone
other than as the statute provides-its parents. Among
such cases are :

Heck v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809, 22 S.E. 153;
Hunt v. Hunt, 37 Me. 333;
Eddie v. Eddie, 8 N.D. 376, 73 Am. St. Rep.
765, 79 N.W. 856;
Stafford v. Houghton, 48 Vt. 236;
Reynolds v. Hitchcock, 72 N.H. 340, 56 Atl.
745;
Williams v. Kimball, 35 Fla. 491, 84 Am. St..
Rep. 238, 16 So. 783 ;
Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430;
Thigpen v. Thigpen, 136 Ga. 541; 71 S.E. 790;
Voorhees v. Sharp, 63 N.J. Eq. 216; 49 Atl.
722;
Re Mericho 63 How Pr (N.Y.) 62;
Waggoner v. Miller, 26 N.C. 486;
Brown v. Kerby, 9 Humph, Tenn. 460;
Jackson v. Jackson, 78 Ky. 390; 39 Am. Rep.
246;
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See 24 A.L.R. page 577, et seq.
Pratt v. Atwood, 108 Mass. 40;

There are a few cases containing similar language
where a different result has been reached, but as stated
by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in the case of
Reynolds v. Hitchcock, supra, the language of the statutes
so construed is much broader than that used in the New
Hampshire statute and is likewise much broader than
the language of our statute, U.C.A. 1943, 101-4-10.
In the light of the decision of our Supreme Court
in the case of Mansfield v. N eft, 43 Ut. 258; 134 Pac. 1160,
we have probably gone to greater pains in directing the
attention of the court to cases from other jurisdictions
where statutes similar to our Section 101-4-10 have been
construed. That Section was Section 714, Compiled Laws
of Utah 1876. It is identical with Section 2833 R. S. 1898;
Sec. 2833 Camp. Laws of Utah 1907. This section is also
identical with Vol. 2, Sec. 2742, 2743, Compiled Laws of
Utah, 1917. It was thus in effect at the times involved
in the case of Mansfield v. Neff, supra.
We will quote at some length from that case; to-wit:
"The principal contentions made by appellant,
however, are based upon questions of law. He contends that he and his sister still living, and the
issue of the sister now deceased, are entitled to
the property in question as the heirs of their
father, Mathew Mansfield; that the latter was
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the heir of John 1\I. ~Iansfield, who was his son
by his plural wife, l\iargaret Haslam, the only
daughter of John Hasla1n, deceased. In this connection it is contended that under our statute
( Comp. Law,.s 1907, section 2781, which was in
force 'vhen John Haslam made his will, and has
continued in force ever since) the will is of no
force or effect as against John M. Mansfield. Said
section reads as follows :
" 'When any testator omits to provide in
his will for any of his children or for the issue
of any deceased child, unless it appears that
such omission was intentional, such child or
the issue of such child must have the same
share in the estate of the testator as if he had
died intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided in the preceding section.'
"John M. Mansfield, it is contended, comes
within the provisions of said section, because he
was the only child and representative of John
Haslam's only daughter, who was dead when the
will was made and became effective. We cannot
yield assent to these contentions. Under the common law, which was in force in the territory of
Utah by virtue of the Organic Act, John M. Mansfield was an illegitimate child, because he was the
fruit of a plural and not of a legal marriage. If he
was an illegitimate child, then he does not come
within either the letter or the spirit of said section.
The section was copied from the statutes of Massachusetts, and this identical question was
squarely determined against appellant's contentions by the Supreme Judicial Court of that state
as early as 1854 in the case of Kent v. Barker, 2
Gray (Mass.) 535. It was there held that the
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ceived and born as the fruit of lawful marriage.
Such a conclusion is reasonable. The statute is,
in one sense, a restriction upon the right of disposition of property by will, and hence its terms
should not be extended by implication. A grandfather, under the common law, certainly was under
no legal obligation to provide for an illegitimate
grandchild, nor was such a child, under that law,
an heir of his grandparent, and, if he was not, the
statute could not have been intended for his protection.
"This is clearly the logic of the case of Estate
of Wardell, 57 Cal.· 484, where it is held that the
provisions apply as between the Mother and her
illegitimate child, for the reason that such child
was the heir of the mother. The California case
is therefore a negative authority for the respondents.
"It is contended, however, that the statute
applied to John M. Mansfield, for the reason that,
under the congressional act of March 22, 1882,
known as the Edmunds Law (1 C.L. Utah 1888,
p. 110), the issue of plural marriages horn before
the 1st day of January, 1883 were legitimated.
While it is true that the testator died in 1882, some
time after the passage of the Edmunds Law, we
think that by that act the status of illegitimate
children was intended to be affected only as between themselves and their parents. It was not
until the legislature of this state in 1896 ( Comp.
Laws 1907, section 2850) passed a law, much more ·
sweeping in its scope and effect, that the chil-dren who were born prior to January 4, 1896, as
the fruit of plural marriages, were legitimated for
all purposes. See Rohwer v. District Court, 41
Utah 279, 125 Pac. 671, where we held that it was
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only after the statute of 1896, and the other statutes there mentioned, and not otherwise, that a
father could inherit from his illegitin1ate child.
The Yie,Ys held by the majority of this court in
the Roh"~er case are fully supported by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cope v. Cope,
137 l .... S. GS:2, 11 Sup. Ct. 222, 34 L. Ed. 832. There,
is however, nothing said in either one of those
cases from "\vhich it can logically be inferred that
the right of inheritance of illegitimate children
"\Yas extended so as to make them heirs of their
grandparents. The right of inheritance of illegitimate children is purely statutory, and, unless the
right is given by statute, no such right exists, because the common law conferred none.
"We are of the opinion, therefore, that neither
John M. ~iansfield nor his father, nor the latter's
heirs, can assail the will of John Haslam, because
it was not made to appear that the latter had intentionally excluded John M. Mansfield from the
will, for the reason that the latter was not an heir
of John Haslam at the time of the latter's death,
or at any other time."
It will be seen from the foregoing history of Section
101-4-10 that such section was a part of our statutory law
at all times involved in the Mansfield v. Neff case, yet it
was held that such law did not render one who was born
when such law was in effect was by such law made legitimate. It is further worthy of note that the law was
taken from Massachusetts where its Supreme Court had
held and still holds that such statute does not render
an illegitimate child entitled to inherit from anyone other
than its parents. The case of Mansfield v. Neff has never
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been reversed and is, we submit, binding upon this court.
Obviously the doctrine announced in the case of Mansfield v. Neff, supra, the claimant was not entitled to inherit from the father of Henry Charles Denhalter because
he was not mentioned in the will of the former.
In the court below the counsel for the plaintiff seems
to get some comfort out of the case of Rohwer v. District
Court of First Judicial District, 41 Utah 279; 125 Pac.
671. It will be noted that the language of the act there
involved provided that such children (the issue of plural
marriages) are hereby legitimated and such issue are
entitled to inherit from both parents and to have and enjoy all rights and privileges to the same extent and in
the same manner as though born in lawful wedlock.
As we read the case it makes against and not in support of claimant's contention. Thus the Court holds that
section 2850 Comp. Laws of Utah 1907, which section
was involved in that case, applied only to plural marriages. On page 287 of the Utah report it is said : "In
what way do any or all nf the foregoing provisions except those found in section 2850 make the children of
void marriages legitimate so as to escape the consequence
of that condition~ The answer is obvious. Neither one
nor all of those provisions have or were intended to have
such effect and a child which is the issue of a so-called
plural marriage or Mormon marriage is no doubt an illegitimate child and, if it were not for the provisions of
section 2850, would have to suffer all the legal if not all
the social consequence of that status."
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At the ti1ne involved in the last above cited case,
section 101-4-10 is identical 'vith section 2833 mentioned
in that opinion. Thus it will be seen that the court expressly held that a child who merely brings itself within
the provisions of 2833 Laws of Utah 1907 now U.C.A.,
1943 101-4-10 does not thereby render such child legitimate so as to entitle it to inherit from anyone other than
its parents. It may also be noted that Section 14-4-12 of
Utah Code Annotated 1943 is identical with Section 10
of Title 2, Comp. Laws of Utah 1907. It is expressly
held that the child whose rights were involved in the
Rohwer v. District Court of First Judicial District case
that section 10 of Title 2, Comp. Laws of Utah 1907 did
not aid the claimant in that case and by the same token
the provisions of 14-4-12 of U.C.A. cannot aid plaintiff's
claim in this case.
It may be noted that under our statutory law even if
it be determined that Henry Charles Denhalter is the
natural father of claimant's father, he could not under
any circumstances inherit from him. U.C.A. 1943 101-4111 provides that:
"If an illegitimate child dies intestate, without
leaving husband or wife or lawful issue, his estate
goes to his Mother or, in case of her decease, to
her heirs at law."
Another fact in this case which under many of the
authorities constitutes an impediment to claimant being
entitled to any of the estate of Mrs. Lewis is U.C.A. 1943
14-4-6, which provides that:
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"A· child when adopted may take the family
name of the person adopting. After adoption, the
two shall sustain the legal relation of parent and
child, and have all the rights and be subject to all
the duties of that relation."
U.C.A. 1943 14-4-11 provides:
"The natural parents of an adopted child are
from the time of the adoption relieved of all paternal duties towards and all responsibility for
the child so adopted, and have no further rights
over it."
In this case the father of the claimant was taken
by the J ohnstons immediately after its birth and thereafter adopted. Under such a state of facts, we find the
law thus stated in 10 C.J.S. 111:
"In some jurisdictions the adoption of an illegitimate child does not deprive such child of the
right ·conferred by statute to inherit from her
natural parents. It has been held, however, that
while the adoption of an illegitimate child pursuant to the applicable statute does not deprive him
of the right to inherit from his natural parent
where such adoption occurs after the death of the
parent, the rule, is otherwise as to the right of an
illegitimate child to inherit from the kindred of
the deceased parent where the adoption is by
strangers and occurs before the death of such
kindred."
Under such doctrine the claimant must fail in this
case because both he and his father were adopted by
strangers before the death of Mrs. Lewis.
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MoreoYer, the follo""ing- cases support the view that
an adopted child 1nay not inherit from its natural parents.
In re H,unsicker-Halterman et al v. Fillencer et al, 65 Cal.
App. 114; 223 Pac. 411: In re Darling 173 Cal. 221; 1~9
Pac. 606; Stamford Trust Co. v. Lokwood, 93 Conn. 337;
119 Atl. 218.
In light of the fact that our statutes relating to adoption are taken from California, the cases above cited from
that state should be entitled to great weight in this state.
By way of summary, the appellants contend:
1. That the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of claimant's witnesses, Mr. Clark and
Mrs. Loveless.
2. That there is not sufficient competent evidence
to support the finding that the claimant is the natural
grandson of Henry Charles Denhalter.
3.

That even if it be concluded that Henry Charles

Denhalter was the grandfather of the claimant, such fact
does not entitle the claimant to participate in the estate
of Mignon D. Lewis, deceased, because the only two
statutes in Utah that legitimates an illegitimate child are:
U.C.A. 1943 12-2-14 and U.C.A. 1943 14-4-12 and that
the claimant does not bring himself within the provisions
of either of those statutes.
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4. That U.C.A. 1943 101-4-10 is calculated to grant
to an illegitimate child the right to inherit from the
parents but not from collateral blood relatives.
5. That the father of the claimant having been
adopted by the J ohnstons and the claimant by English,
he is precluded from participating in the estate of Mrs.
Lewis, even though he be held to be a blood relative.
It is submitted that the Decree and Judgment appealed from should be reversed and that it be determined
that the claimant is not entitled to participate in the distribution of the estate of Mignon D. Lewis, deceased, and
that appellants be awarded their costs.
Respectfully submitted,

ELIAS HANSEN
.Attorney for· .Appellants
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